The role of peace in Kelsen and Lauterpacht’s theories of international law by Mario Krešić
485
Dr.sc. Mario Krešić, assistant professor
University of Zagreb Faculty of Law
THE ROLE OF PEACE IN KELSEN AND LAUTERPACHT’S 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
UDK: 172. 4 : 341
Accepted: 15. 12. 2018.
Review article
The purpose of this article is to analyze the role of peace in the theory of international law of 
Hans Kelsen and Hersh Lauterpacht. The 1960 shift in Kelsen’ s approach to the role of peace will 
be elaborated in detail. Along with the theoretical account on the connection between peace and 
law, both authors have directed their theories to practical matters in the existing international legal 
system. At the end of the analysis, the similarities and differences between Kelsen and Lauterpacht 
will be described.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Hans Kelsen and Hersch Lauterpacht have both developed the connection 
between peace and international law. The aim of this article is to analyse how they 
have established this connection, to present some details on how they directed 
theory regarding this connection to practical considerations in international law 
and to portray the meaning of the role of peace as seen by both authors. 
The second chapter reflects research on the role of peace in Kelsen’s theory, 
established through his concept of law as the coercive order of behaviour. The main 
change in his approach to the role of peace appears in 1960, when, as a necessary 
element of the concept of law, he abandoned the function of protecting peace as a 
part of the regulation of the behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the connection, through the concept of coerciveness, remains not 
only theoretically in place but in describing the content of the existing law as well. 
The third chapter outlines Lauterpacht’ s position regarding the role of peace in the 
context of his methodology of law and his view on the general principles of law. As 
the postulate of the law, the role of peace is used by Lauterpacht in order to provide 
legal argument against the existing rules. In my conclusion, the approaches of both 
authors will be compared.
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2. KELSEN ON THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Kelsen’s considerations on the relation between law and peace are obvious in 
the two elements of his concept of law: a) law as an order of behavior; b) law as a 
coercive order.
We have termed the connection in the context of how the law functions in 
ordering of behavior, the stronger element, and the connection between law and 
peace in the context of coerciveness, the weaker element. On the one side, the 
first connection is stronger in that it directly connects the law and peace while the 
second connection is weaker as it establishes an indirect connection through the law-
operative function in imposing sanctions. On the other side, the difference is based 
on the scope of requirements. The first connection requires the absence of force in 
all mutual relations between its subjects (except those in which the official organs 
are imposing sanctions) and centralization of the law-operative functions (at least 
adjudication), while the second one requires only a monopoly of force, which can 
even be decentralized.
2.1. Kelsen’s stronger connection between the role of peace and 
International Law
Kelsen has postulated “the order of behavior” as the necessary characteristic of 
every legal system.  Legal theory and doctrine, commonly describe international 
law as the body of rules which, primarily, govern the behavior of the states (Kelsen, 
1952, p. 3). From the characteristic that the law governs behavior through the 
application of general norms in particular situations, it is possible to presuppose 
that subjects in the society governed by law will necessarily accept the value of 
peace at least in some periods of the regulation of their community life.1 Instead 
of this conclusion, however, it seems as though Kelsen has taken an all or nothing 
position. First, he considers that the protection of peace is the absence of coercive 
interference, in all spheres of interest of its subjects (except in the case of sanctions), 
is the necessary element of the concept of law (Kelsen, 1948, p.14) and later, he 
claims that such a function is not necessary for law at all (Kelsen, 1960). More 
precisely, Stanley L. Paulson (2017a, p. 598) tales note of three phases in Kelsen’s 
writing. In his very early work, Kelsen accepts that law is the means for such a 
function, but voices his opposition to the idea that it is a component of the concept 
of law (Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 1911). Later, in the period from 1942 
to 1960, Kelsen considers such a function inside the concept of law, and finally, in 
1960 he retracts that idea.
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Although Kelsen after 1960 no longer considers that function as a part of the 
concept of law, in that latter phase of his work, Kelsen notices a tendency common 
to all legal systems concerning the “legal value to be realised”, namely, the value 
of peace as the prohibition of the forcible interference in all ‘private’ spheres of the 
subject’s life. In his words, “it is the tendency gradually and increasingly to prohibit 
the use of physical force from man to man” (Kelsen, 2005, p. 36).
In that latter phase, the consideration on the function of law to guarantee the peace 
in all relations is reduced to the claim that pacification of the legal community by the 
legal order is an “objectively determinable fact” (Kelsen, 2005, p. 48). Nevertheless, 
it is possible to question whether that fact can be explained without considering at 
least the contingent, but the lasting characteristics of the subjects of law. If the law 
is an order of behavior, it can be assumed that the law always has some functions 
that depend on the characteristics of its subjects, although it does not mean that 
all legal orders have the same functions at all times. In the previous phase, Kelsen 
indirectly refers to the characteristics of the subject of law when describing the 
tendency of imposing restrictions on forcible interference in the sphere of individual 
life. “A community, in long run, is possible only if each individual respects certain 
interests - life, health, freedom and property of everyone else, that is to say, if 
each refrains from forcibly interfering in these spheres of interest of the others” 
(Kelsen, 1949, p. 22). The consideration of the characteristics of the subjects of law 
seems to be crucial for the tendency towards pacification. Hart showed how exactly 
this consideration can be used to explain the differences in pacification in national 
and international communities. Before doing that, he has described in detail the 
minimum substantive content of the legal system based on the lasting characteristics 
of the subjects of law (Hart, 2015, pp. 193-200).  
Even if we look only at Kelsen’s explicit account on the tendency towards 
pacification, without connecting it with the permanent or lasting characteristics 
of its subjects, it confirms that there is a stronger connection between peace and 
international law for as long as this tendency exists. 
2.2. Kelsen’s weaker connection between the role of peace and 
international Law
Besides the connection established through the functions of law regarding the 
regulation of behavior, Kelsen establishes the connection between law and the role 
of peace in elaborating coercion as a characteristic of his concept of law. 
The system of norms is coercive when it contains norms reflecting the 
community’s monopoly on the use of force in reacting to normatively defined 
undesirable behavior, which is called a delict. “If a social order provides that 
coercive acts shall be performed only under definite conditions, determined by it, 
and only by definite individuals, likewise determined by it, and if we consider these 
individuals as organs of the community constituted by the social order, we may say 
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that the social order reserves the employment of force to the community. Such a 
social order establishes a force monopoly of the community” (Kelsen, 1952, p. 14). 
The law is by definition an order with the monopoly of force. 
The reaction of the community organs towards a delict is called a sanction. The 
function of law to impose sanctions for delicts also means that the function of law 
is to redress the violation of rights (Kelsen, 2001, p. 4 and 6). Kelsen defines the 
reaction of the community to a delict as legal security and legal security is defined 
as relative peace (Kelsen, 2001, p. 6). In that way, the monopoly of force restricts 
the situations in which the use of force arises.
The necessary element of law is not only that it empowers legal organs to use 
force by means of sanctions but also that it reserves, in principle, the use of force to 
these organs alone. “Law is an order according to which the use of force is generally 
forbidden but exceptionally, under certain circumstances and for certain individuals, 
permitted as sanction” (Kelsen, 1948, p. 22; see also Kelsen, 1952, p. 15 and 18). 
The empowerment norm to impose sanctions can be described as determining the 
following conditions for the use of force: a) a legal organ is authorized by the order 
to use force, whereby in the case of self-help the authorization is provided only to the 
injured party acting as the official organ; b) authorization refers only to the situation 
of a delict; c) the use of force in other situations is, in principle, prohibited as a 
delict. This last condition means that the situation of a delict, in principle, includes 
the use of physical force which is not a sanction. When Kelsen mentions the use of 
force which is in principle forbidden (‘relative peace’), he refers to the exception 
in the use of force by official organs implementing sanctions. Nevertheless, there 
is no reason to exclude the possibility that the legal organ itself may determine 
situations when private persons can use force without committing a delict. The 
legal system can institutionalize exceptions, for example, when a duel is permitted 
by the legal order or the use of force is permitted towards some groups within the 
society without sanction. Apart from these situations, the use of force can be said 
to be forbidden. This broader understanding makes it possible to conceal Kelsen’ s 
concept on the monopoly of force with his 1960 shift regarding the function of law 
to guarantee the peace in all relations between its’ subjects.
Kelsen’s concept of law is not limited only to systems with centralized legal 
organs paradigmatically described as state-like legal systems. He finds the monopoly 
of force - centralized or decentralized - to be necessarily characteristic of law that 
distinguishes the legal order from other social orders. The legal limitations on the 
use of force are needed if any system of norms is to be considered as law. These 
limitations are established by the norms respecting legal coercion, which limits 
the use of force to situations of the implementation of law and to the situations 
that do not count as delicts. It is only if these norms do not exist that the use of 
force is absolutely uncontrolled. In such a social order, there is no monopoly of the 
community on the use of force and consequently no law at all, according to Kelsen’s 
concept. 
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A normative system with decentralized legal organs for the use of force is also 
considered a legal system for it, too, limits the use of force. Therefore, the monopoly 
of force as a distinguishing characteristic of the legal order is also applicable to 
international law. Although war is not necessarily prohibited by international law, it 
is always controlled by law. In primitive systems of international law in which war 
is not prohibited, the use of force is nevertheless limited. Even in decentralized legal 
systems such as the primitive system of international law, where the institutional 
practice of self-help is, by rule, allowed, the force that purports to be legal must be 
used only in the way the legal organ would use it, and this means in accordance with 
the law and as an implementation of the decision reached by the application of legal 
norms. We can add that other non-official uses of force could be allowed only if 
that are not considered as delicts. This broader concept of law with a decentralized 
monopoly of force makes it possible for Kelsen to include the international 
normative system, in which there is no centralized organ empowered to impose 
sanctions, under the concept of law.
2.3. The value of peace after 1960
In the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law (1960), Kelsen indicates that 
he has modified his view on the relation between law and peace. But was that an 
undeniable change from the point of view on the legal order as the coercive order?
2.3.1. Difference between the primitive and developed legal order
Firstly, the order with a decentralized monopoly of force in which self-help 
prevails, is, after 1960, still considered by Kelsen to be a legal order in which 
minimal protection against the use of physical force exists. Secondly, even before 
1960, Kelsen ascertains a difference in the degree of peace protection between the 
primitive and the developed legal order. 
The change appears because, from then on, Kelsen assumes that the “real” 
function of the protection of peace exists only in the latter case. He “assumes 
that pacification of the legal community takes place only on that [higher] level of 
legal development” and “he can hardly assume even a relative pacification of the 
legal community so long as the law is still in primitive condition” (Kelsen, 2005, 
p. 38). The primitive conditions that Kelsen mentions are numerous: absence of 
compulsory adjudication, nonexistence of the centralized executive organ for the 
use of force, blood revenge and the duel as legal institutions, permission to kill 
slaves and aliens, situations in which war is not prohibited in relations between 
states. It seems that even the Charter law has no “real” peace securing function due 
to its lack of compulsory adjudication. Based on the observations of the historically 
primitive orders, which Kelsen still considers legal orders, and due to his new 
categorization of the pacifying function, he concludes that securing peace is not an 
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essential moral value common to all legal orders or an essential function of the law 
(Kelsen, 2005, p. 38).
But if we return to the beginning of his 1960’s explanation of the relations 
between the legal order and peace, we will find claims that “the aim of collective 
security is peace” and that minimum collective security exists in the decentralized 
legal order. He continues with the statement that “by establishing a monopoly of 
force in the legal community, the legal order pacifies this community” (Kelsen, 
2005, p. 37). Accordingly, a primitive legal order is also an order of peace by virtue 
of the normative determinations on the conditions for the use of force. According 
to Kletzer, it is a situation of  “messy peace”; it is sociologically a situation of war 
but legally interpreted a situation of peace-keeping; it is not a moral demand of the 
(primitive) order that there be peace, but legal declaration of a certain force to be 
the force of law; it might be seen as a peace situation only in name, but it is the 
beginning of the peace-keeping process that can be ‘tidied up’ by the process of 
centralization; and peace-keeping presupposes peace (Kletzer, 2018, p.39). 
It seems that we could reconcile the two positions if we differentiate between 
peace in the primitive legal order and peace in the developed legal order. Both kinds 
of order protect peace by means of a legal determination of the conditions for the 
use of force. In the primitive order, the conditions are primarily formal regarding the 
implementation of sanctions, and less efficient for securing peace for all members of 
the society. In the developed order, the conditions are formal regarding sanctions but 
they are also more substantive in that they cover the overall protection from forcible 
interference in all the spheres of the subjects’ interests e.g. life and property. They 
are also more efficient with respect to the determination of delicts in a concrete 
situation,
2.3.2. Difference between two characteristics of the basic norm
The second edition of the Pure Theory of Law (1960) brings forth another 
dilemma in the relation between law and peace. Kelsen claims that no value 
transcending positive law is inherent in the basic norm of international law and that 
the legal order is not valid by virtue of assuming the value of peace (Kelsen, 2005, 
p. 216). Accordingly, peace is not the necessary element of the concept of law. 
(Kelsen, 2005, p. 216). At the same time, as mentioned above, he claims that the 
normative system is a legal system only if a monopoly of force is established and 
therefore the peace-keeping introduced. The contradiction can be analysed based on 
Stanley L. Paulson’s description of the basic norm characteristics (Paulson, 2018), 
namely the empowerment characteristics. 
Two empowerment characteristics of the basic norm can be distinguished: a) the 
empowerment of the creation of norms and b) the empowerment of imposing the 
sanctions. Any legal system necessarily performs law-operative functions which 
correspond to these two basic norm characteristics. To state, as a hypothesis, that 
the legal order contains the basic norm which empowers legal organs to impose 
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sanctions, is the same as to state that the legal order has the function of reacting to 
a delict which, in principle, contains behaviour of using force other than a sanction. 
In that way the peace-keeping function is established. 
Regarding municipal law, Kelsen describes the empowerment characteristic of 
the basic norm in the following way. “If the law is conceived as a coercive order, 
then the formula by which the basic norm of a national order is expressed runs as 
follows: ‘Coercion of man against man ought to be exercised in the manner and 
under conditions determined by the historically first constitution.’” (Kelsen, 2005, p. 
50). A similar formula can be found for international law: “Coercion of state against 
state ought to be exercised under the condition and in the manner, that conform 
with the custom constituted by the actual behavior of the states.” (Kelsen, 2005, 
p. 216). This formula demonstrates that Kelsen contemplates that the basic norm, 
besides the reference to the first source of law (constitution, custom), also contains 
reference regarding coercion. We are not sure that this formula alone could satisfy 
his definition of law without the determinations on empowerment mentioned above, 
since we can imagine the constitution prescribing that ‘coercion should be exercised 
as the part of religious ceremony by all subjects every morning but not on Sunday’, 
as the only condition for the use of coercion. Nevertheless, even this formula, by 
requiring conditions on the use of force, presents the limitation of the use of force 
and consequently the protection of peace, that is, of the absence of force at least in 
some situations.
When the first characteristic of the basic norm is applied to the normative system 
alone, the protection of the value of peace becomes the legal norm, only if it is 
created by a custom or a first constitution. While, according to the second one, the 
protection of the role of value is directed to the norm of the legal system based on 
the hypothesis of the law-enforcing organ’s authority, granted by a legal order, to 
sanction a delict. If the particular normative order does not empower any legal organ 
to impose sanctions, there is no legal system. Kelsen claims that international law 
is a legal system because states are empowered to produce norms through custom 
and states as decentralized legal organs are empowered to use force only in the case 
of illegal acts. 
Both empowerments are the hypotheses of general international law as perceived 
by Kelsen. While the first one – custom as the source of international law - is 
explicitly stated in the formula as the empowerment based on the basic norm, it 
can be interpreted that Kelsen see the second empowerment as the one ‘delegated’ 
by the basic norm through a custom that, on the other hand, he presupposes, has 
produced such an empowerment of states so as to impose sanctions. Even in that 
case, the two hypotheses are necessary since “[t]ogether with the basic norm 
the definition of law as a coercive order is presupposed” (Kelsen, 2005, p. 50). 
Without the empowerment of the sanctioning organ, the international order is only 
a customarily moral order. “If the law is not defined as a coercive order, but only 
as an order established according to a basic norm [… a] legal norm established by 
custom could not be distinguished from a customarily established moral norm at 
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all” (Kelsen, 2005, p 53). Notwithstanding the interpretation that, at least in logical 
relations, the empowerment on custom precedes the empowerment on sanctioning 
organs, due to the definition of the law as the coercive order, the protection of peace 
has to necessarily appear in the international legal order. 
Additionally, we can continue with the analysis of the claim of ‘deriving’ the 
second hypothesis from the first one in more detail. The first hypothesis authorizes 
states to create norms by custom, and the second one empowers states themselves 
to impose sanctions. As mentioned before, the acceptance of the first hypothesis 
without the second one is insufficient to view the international normative system 
as international law. Since the basic norm empowers the production of law through 
custom, the ‘international legal order’ would begin with the production of norms 
by the appearance of custom, but at the same time it would not be established 
by definition until custom has established a sanctioning organ. It does not make 
sense to say that the ‘international legal order’ could by custom decide not to have 
any sanctioning organs.  Not, at any rate, if the sanctioning organ is necessarily 
characteristic of law. Therefore, the moment of the norm-creating empowerment 
cannot be separated from the moment of the sanction-imposing empowerment. If 
these two hypotheses in international law have to come together, then they are both 
incorporated in the basic norm. Consequently, it can be assumed that the basic norm 
‘prescribes’ directly the empowerment of the sanctioning organ and that it is not 
derived from the first hypothesis.
2.3.3. Difference between the minimum and maximum content of the value 
of peace 
Finally, Kelsen rejects the thesis that law in its essence represents a moral 
minimum - that a coercive order, to be regarded as law, must fulfil a minimum moral 
postulate. The legal value does not represent a moral minimum in the sense that the 
peace value is an element essential for the concept of law (Kelsen, 2005, p. 64).
Nevertheless, Kelsen considers that law constitutes value, legal value, based on 
the fact that it is a norm which implies that man ought to behave in a certain way 
(Kelsen, 2005, p. 65). “The relative moral value is established by a social norm that 
man ought to behave in a certain way. Norm and value are correlative concepts […] 
The statement that “law is moral by nature” does not mean that law has a certain 
content, but that it is a norm - namely a social norm that man ought to behave 
in a certain way […L]aw constitutes a value precisely by the fact it is a norm: it 
constitutes the legal value which, at the same time, is a (relative) moral value; which 
means that the law is norm” (Kelsen, 2005, p. 64). 
The value of peace understood as the absolute prohibition of interference in 
different spheres of interests might be substantial enough to count among other 
moral values which are not a part of the content of the law. But the legal value of 
normativity is formal enough to avoid any implication of a minimal moral postulate. 
Likewise, peace as the monopoly on the use of force can then also be seen as a legal 
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value. This meaning of peace refers only to the authority of the legal order to react 
through legal organs to the use of force, other than as a sanction. This meaning of 
peace refers to ‘messy peace’ of controlling the use of force as mentioned before. 
2.3.4. Realistic theory of law after 1962
After 1962 Kelsen substituted the thesis that ‘law is normative’ (based on 
the Kantian-inspired basic norm) with the thesis ‘as if the law were normative’ 
(Paulson, 2017b, p. 883-885). This shift could be interpreted as a move towards the 
realistic theory of law which could also be seen as requiring the modification of his 
considerations on general international law. The understanding of the basic norm as 
a fiction addresses not only the question of normativity but also the question of the 
basic characteristics of the law contained in the basic norm such is the monopoly 
of the order to impose sanctions. Nevertheless, whatever the final result of the 
theoretical discussion on the Kelsen’ s basic norm after 1962 might be, the coercive 
character of the legal order remains in Kelsen’ s definition of the law. It was the 
ground for his account on the content of general international law, namely that war 
and reprisals were the content of general international law if it were law at all. And 
this position was not changed by Kelsen after 1962.      
2.4. Practical implications of Kelsen’s theory of law
Kelsen has not confined himself to the theory of law but has addressed practical 
issues respecting international legal norms as well. He claims that his conceptual 
characteristic of war and reprisals, as the sanctions of international law, find their 
confirmation in general international law, which is customary law. “It may be 
argued that, in accordance with general international law, a forcible interference 
in the sphere of interest of a state, that is reprisals or war, is permitted only as a 
reaction against a violation of law, that is to say as sanction. Since the enforcement 
actions determined by Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter constitute forcible 
interference in the sphere of a state, they must be interpreted as sanctions if the 
Charter is supposed to be in conformity with general international law” (Kelsen, 
1951, p. 735). 
It is very difficult to prove that norms on war and reprisals as the sanctions 
of the legal organs were really part of general international law, and not simply 
Kelsen’s inclination in his concept of the existing normative system. Francois 
Rigaux considers this attempt as blurring the distinction between international law 
and international morality. “Coming back to the juridical nature of international 
law as a coercive order based on the belum iustum doctrine, one cannot dismiss 
the thought that the doctrine is more an article of faith than an observed reality. 
When Kelsen contemplates the positive aspects of the just war, he inevitably blurs 
the distinction between international law and international morality: the conviction 
that war is a delict is not supported by general international law […] In any event, 
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the belium iustum doctrine, which is the cornerstone of Kelsen’s characterization of 
international law as a legal order, is not devoid of references to international morality 
in his system and does not fit properly his nomological approach” (Rigaux, 1998, 
p. 325). Oliver J. Lissitzyn considered some practical problems regarding Kelsen’s 
concept of sanction, as the result of his “misplaced effort to squeeze international 
law into his conception of ‘law’ as a ‘coercive order’ backed by physical force” 
(Lissitzyn, 1954, p.306).
The account of a decentralized monopoly of force is based on these hypotheses 
and not on the factual norms of international law. Even when Kelsen describes 
historical facts to prove that the norm imposed on states in the form of sanctioning 
organs is accepted by states as a part of the general international law, which is not 
a convincing description of international relations, that does not have any influence 
on the presupposed empowerment hypotheses and his scientific consideration of 
the international normative system as law. His effort to prove the factual existence 
of the sanctioning theory in general international law is important as a means of 
strengthening his argument when interpreting the international norms in light of his 
theory, that is, in accordance with general international law. 
The unclear position regarding the continuation of the existence of general 
international law after the Charter came into force, can be understood as Kelsen’s 
hesitancy over the strategy of established critics of the Charter: de lege lata critics 
based on his concept of law projected into the existing general international law 
or critics based on detecting the deficiencies in the posited law and eventually 
proposing some de lege ferenda improvements. In the “Law of the United Nations” 
(1951) the first approach is obvious when he interprets some of the Charter’s articles 
in conformity with his view on the content of general international law.
The interpretation of norms in light of his concept has to be of great importance 
when comparing general international law, which according to Kelsen, confirms his 
thesis on war and reprisals as sanctions in international law, with the Charter law, 
which, he claims, purports to become general international law:
Nonfulfillment of a treaty obligation, e.g., may not be considered by the 
Security Council or by the General Assembly as a threat to or breach of the 
peace, and hence not as a delict under the Charter, but it is a delict under 
general international law.  However, it is a delict under general international 
law only because general international law authorizes the contracting party 
whose interest is violated by the nonfulfillment of the treaty to resort to 
reprisals or war against the other contracting party responsible for the 
nonfulfillment (Kelsen, 1952, p. 57). 
The consequence of the gap between the Charter and general international law 
on sanctions, which is of course the same as his conception of law, is significant:
[T]he Charter does not provide for collective sanctions to be taken by 
the Organization against every conduct of a state which, under general 
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international law, is an international delict. This is no improvement of 
general international law; and if a legal obligation to behave in a certain way 
is assumed to exist only if a sanction is provided as a reaction against the 
contrary behaviour, the Charter has the undesirable effect of depriving of their 
legal character all obligations established by general international law which 
are not at the same time obligations under the Charter” (Kelsen, 1952, p. 58). 
This is the first difference between general international law and the Charter 
law. It can be summarized in the following way: general international law provides 
sanctions for a greater range of conduct, while the Charter provides sanctions only 
for a very modest range of conduct limited by the legal standard of “threat or use 
of force”. If the sanction is considered as a kind of control of violence as described 
above, then a broader scope of relations is submitted to peace-keeping function 
under the general international law. The second difference is that, according to 
general international law, there is a legal possibility that every dispute may be 
resolved, although through the use of wrong means, while under the Charter there 
exists a possibility that some disputes may never be resolved (Kelsen, 1951, p. 
270). Thirdly, while under general international law the legal use of force was 
aimed at maintaining the existing law, the Charter enables the use of force by the 
Security Council not necessarily only for the purpose of maintenance or restoration 
of the existing law (Kelsen, 1951, p. 294). In other words, the positive legal order 
established by the Charter is more a rule of peace between the states and less a rule 
by law, while general international law is less a rule of peace and more a rule by law. 
Kelsen tries to resolve this problem of “law without peace” and “peace without law” 
by the concept of “peace through law”. It is the peace achieved through compulsory 
adjudication for all international disputes (Kelsen, 2008).
3. LAUTERPACHT’S VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE
In the previous section we have focused on Hans Kelsen’s elaboration of the 
connection between peace and law. In this second section we will explain why 
we consider that Hersch Lauterpacht assumes the value of peace to be a necessary 
element of the law based on his methodological approach to law.  Before we focus 
on the elaboration of the values of peace, which is an important part of Lauterpacht’s 
understanding of law, we will explain his view of the conception of the law in more 
detail. 
3.1. Lauterpacht’s methodological approach
Lauterpacht does not make a conceptual distinction between municipal and 
international law. Following the general conception of law, he provides the 
definition of international law as the body of the rules of conduct, enforceable by 
external sanction, which confer rights and impose obligations primarily upon states 
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(Lauterpacht, 1978, p. 9). He does not, like Kelsen, broaden the concept of law 
with hypotheses that are according to Lauterpacht ‘artificial’. He does not make 
any conceptual distinction between municipal and international law, and in light of 
the former characteristics, the shortcomings of international law become obvious. 
They “impair the legal nature of what is described as international law but they do 
not destroy it altogether” (Lauterpacht, 1978, p.31). 
The first reason, mentioned in his broader set of law characteristics, that individual 
defects of international law do not destroy international law, is a hypothesis, set 
up at the request of judges and legal scientists, that ‘we’ do not regard them as 
permanently associated with it and as inherent in its very nature, in the sense that it 
is a system of law intrinsically different from that of the State” (Lauterpacht, 1978, 
p. 31). This can be understood as a de lege ferenda request to address some of 
the deficiencies of international law. But some of the characteristics, which are by 
Lauterpacht ‘translated’ in his general principles of the existing law, judges “ought” 
to respect and they ought to change other norms of the positive law which oppose 
such principles. The second reason is that it seems, according to Lauterpacht, that 
the malfunctioning results of one defective characteristic can be replaced by the 
results of other characteristics.
Nevertheless, later in the “Functions of Law”, we find that he considers some 
characteristics as necessary. As we will see later, the value of peace, understood as 
the postulate of ‘juridical logic’, is the necessary characteristic of law. The norm-
creating, norm-applying and norm-enforcing characteristics of law, according 
to his writing in the “Functions of Law”, are the necessary characteristics, but 
the form of their appearance, at least for some of them, is only essential. For 
example, sovereign law-making authority is important for law and for some other 
characteristics of law, but custom can also serve the purpose of law creation. The 
centralized enforcement organs are, in the same vain, essential, but their purpose 
can be fulfilled by the institution of self-help (Lauterpacht, 2000, p. 441). The legal 
order without the compulsory adjudication of ascertain disputed rights, appears to 
be more problematic. In the best case, it would be a ‘rudimentary legal order’. At 
the same time Lauterpacht considers that the objectivity of the normative order 
disappears in the case of deficient production of norms through custom and the 
absence of compulsory adjudication. The objectivity of law seems to be a necessary 
characteristic of the law and in that case compulsory adjudication is a sufficient 
characteristic. It might not be necessary under the condition that the other two 
institutional characteristics are such that they can neutralize the defects of the 
system without compulsory adjudication. Lauterpacht has emphasised that certain 
other defects can hardly be resolved without compulsory adjudication and if that 
is true, compulsory adjudication could be a serious candidate for becoming the 
necessary characteristic in his conception of law.
By referring to these three institutional characteristics, Lauterpacht maintains 
that “it is permissible to ignore the vitiating consequences of any single defect only 
if other essential elements are present to neutralize the results of the shortcomings in 
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one particular sphere. To assert the possibility of the existence of a legal system in 
which all these elements are lacking is to reduce the conception of law to a shadow 
of its own self, or else to apply it in a meaning different from that usually attached 
to it” (Lauterpacht, 2000, p. 441). 
The postulates of law, which Lauterpacht proposes in his conception of law, are 
not only theoretical prescriptions. Through the general principles of law, they are 
integrated as a part of the positive legal system. They are derived from the “reason 
of the thing” which comes from the existence and needs of the international society 
conceived as a community of States under the rule of law. “They are the result of 
the application of general principles of law - including the acknowledged general 
principles of international law itself - to the relations of States and, in proper cases, 
of the individuals who compose them” (Lauterpacht, 1978, p. 54). Although they do 
not override custom and treaties, but rather supplement them, the norms produced 
by this source can be interpreted in reference to the general principles of law and 
those principles are to be used for resolving the problems of the immaturity of 
positive international law induced by states (Lauterpacht, 1978, p. 54).
3.2. Lauterpacht’s value of peace as peace through law 
Hersch Lauterpacht clearly states that the value of international peace has the 
same meaning as the peace which exists in the municipal legal systems. According 
to Lauterpacht, the function of law is to preserve peace and “[i]ts fundamental 
precept is, ‘there shall be no violence’.” (Lauterpacht, 2000, p. 72). This is the 
reason why a judge cannot refuse to adjudicate. For him, „peace is pre-eminently 
a legal postulate. Juridically it is a metaphor for the postulate of the unity of the 
legal system. Juridical logic inevitably leads to condemnation, as a matter of law, 
of anarchy and private force” (Lauterpacht, 2000, p. 438).  
As the fundamental postulate of law, the value of peace is included in the general 
principles to be applied by judges. For example, when considering the existing rule 
against the compulsory adjudication, the value of peace presents one of the main 
reasons why this rule should be abandoned. The argumentation is based on the 
claim that this rule conflicts with “the general principles of law and the conception 
of law itself as generally recognized.” (Lauterpacht, 2000, 431). As we have seen 
the protection of the value of peace belongs to such principles and the conception of 
law as generally recognized. Moreover, the compulsory adjudication is an essential 
condition for peace as the absence of the violence. According to Lauterpacht, peace 
among nations, as the absence of the violence among nations, can be achieved by 
different means and the reign of law which incorporates compulsory adjudication 
is only one of the possibilities (Lauterpacht, 2000, 437). Nevertheless, the peace 
secured through compulsory adjudication is a different kind of peace and not only 
the pure absence of force. It enables the realization of the principle of equity and 
certainty as the general principles of law. In this context we should look at his 
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claim that the reign of law, i.e. peace through compulsory adjudication, presents an 
essential condition of peace, i.e. peace as the pure absence of the force. 
The omnis judex principle confirmed in the opinion of the Permanent Court has 
to be, as a matter of law, inquired into and possibly corrected by the new decisions 
of the courts. “The international lawyer must not regard himself as being prevented 
from attempting that task on the ground that the Permanent Court of International 
Justice has repeatedly expressed the opinion that it is a clear rule of international 
law that a State cannot be compelled against its will to submit its disputes with other 
States for international adjudication, and that its jurisdiction is strictly limited by the 
will of States” (Lauterpacht, 2000, 435).
4. CONCLUSION: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN THE KELSEN AND LAUTERPACHT
In the light of the analysis of Kelsen and Lauterpacht’ s theories on the connection 
between the international law and the value of peace we can find two similarities 
and two differences between them.  
Both authors, Kelsen and Lauterpacht have established the connection between 
peace and law through their conceptions of the law. It can be said that the protection 
of the value of peace is stipulated by their theories. The protection of the value of 
peace is the necessary element of their conceptions of law and important for the 
functioning of the law itself, without a necessary reference to other purposes outside 
the law. That is why we can consider it as something inherent to the law. 
The second similarity between both authors can be seen in their attempts to 
use the inherent value of peace in the argumentation regarding the norms of the 
existing system of international law. Kelsen has criticized the existing international 
legal order grounded on: a) the general prohibition of the use and threat of force by 
states and b) the possibility of the forcible legal reaction limited only to the cases 
of the threat or use of force. The argument is based on the conflict between the 
concept of the value of peace contained in the general international law (i.e. general 
international law as perceived by Kelsen) and the existing UN rules. Lauterpacht has 
argued against the omnis judex principle based on the conflict between the existing 
rule and the general principles of law including the principle on the protection of 
the value of peace as the inherent value of law. 
The first difference is methodological. While Kelsen has tried to unify municipal 
and international law under the same concept of law by looking for the minimum 
content identical in both normative systems, Lauterpacht considers that both systems 
belong to the same concept of law with the maximum content which actually exists 
in the municipal law.  
The second difference between two authors can be seen in the different meanings 
they ascribe to the value of peace. 
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From Kelsen’s theory of international law, it is possible to recognize three 
meanings of the value of international peace. The first one is the Groatian meaning 
of peace as the minimum of protection of states from the use of force by other states. 
It is aimed at the control of force by conditioning its use by reasons of law. The 
second meaning is the value of peace as the absence of any use of force, whatever 
the reasons could be, but with no reference to the compulsory application of law 
for all dispute settlements. This meaning of the value of peace is obvious in the 
existing international law in the norm on prohibition of war together with omnis 
judex principle. As we have seen, Kelsen takes a very critical attitude to such a 
state of affairs. 
The third meaning is peace through law. As Jochen Rauber has noted, a Kantian 
peace entails more than the factual absence of the use of force. “In Kantian terms, 
peace necessarily implies a state of lawfulness, a legal relation between possibly 
conflicting parties, in short: the rule of law. In sum, his concept of peace not only 
prohibits the use of force, but encompasses the duty to establish a legal order 
maintaining the conditions of future peace” (Rauber, 2009, p.60). This Kantian 
understanding of international peace requires the submission of states to the law 
and the elimination of situations in which violation of law could arise (Kant, 1917, 
p. 120). It is similar to the value of the rule of law. This description of the value 
of peace comes from the combination of the law-operative function related to the 
process of applying law and the law-regulative function of resolving disputes. It is 
realized when solutions to international problems are found through applying its 
general legal standards, that are equal and certain for all states. The international 
law malfunctions not only when international disputes result in war, but even when 
international law fails to respond to disputes and such failure presents a potential 
danger of war. Kelsen describes this sense of law in the following way. “Law 
is, essentially, an order for the promotion of peace. Its purpose is to assure the 
peaceful living together of a group of individuals in such a way they may settle 
their inevitable conflicts in a peaceful manner; that is, without the use of force, in 
conformity with an order valid for all. This order is the law. Is international law also 
such an order? And if not, what is the way to make of international law a workable 
order for the promotion of peace?” (Kelsen, 1948, p. 1). In the same work, Kelsen, 
as early as 1942, points to the necessity of establishing compulsory adjudication in 
the international order. 
While Lauterpacht remains with the third meaning of the peace as peace through 
law, Kelsen has changed his position. The similarity between two authors, Kelsen 
and Lauterpacht, exists in the first period of Kelsen’ s work until 1960. After that 
Kelsen accepted the minimal meaning of the value of peace which is connected 
with his coercive theory of law while Lauterpacht remains with the conceptual 
characteristic of the value of peace with the maximum content as the law through 
peace. This does not mean that Kelsen has necessarily abandoned the role of peace 
through law as unimportant. The minimum content of the value of peace in the 
first sense remains within his concept of law while the value of peace through 
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law remains for him the matter of de lege ferenda based on the tendencies of the 
pacification. 
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SAŽETAK:
Cilj ovog članka je analizirati ulogu mira u teorijama međunarodnog prava Hansa Kelsena i 
Hersha Lauterpachta. Posebno će se obraditi promjena u Kelsenovom pristupu ulozi mira nakon 
1960 godine. Uz teorijska razmatranja povezanosti mira i prava, oba autora su usmjerili svoje teorije 
prema praktičnim problemima. Na kraju analize prikazat će se sličnosti  i razlike između Kelsena i 
Lauterpachta.  
Ključne riječi: pravna teorija, međunarodno prava, pravne vrijednosti, mir, Kelsen, 
Lauterpacht
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